Johnnie's last post illustrates that here at the League of the Scarlet Pimpernel we provide top of the line joint-operations military analysis (he an old seadog, me a ground pounder). I suppose we could balance out our analysis a bit with the addition of someone from the Air Force but really, do we truly want to hear how great those over-rated bus drivers/mailmen believe they are - the Air Force delivers stuff - people, material or ordinance. Johnnie and I can handle any analysis of that.
Seriously though, the potential situation in Iraq vis-a-vis a US attack on Iran is fraught with danger. I am certain that there are many Air Force Powerpoint wizards right now developing a comprehensive list of targets (well actually this is already done, they are just refining their slides at this point). The poor, dumb Army and Marines in the room are forced to talk in positive terms about how ground forces can meet and defeat additional Iranian conventional forces in Iraq (unconventional forces have been there for some time) long enough for the Air Force to kill the head of the beast and destroy any hope of an Iranian resupply.
This all sounds good and the ground pounders that are working out the details are not completely telling untruths. But they are not telling the entire truth either. Consider a bunch of political generals in a room, the Air Force has a rosy optimistic plan for quick victory - all the Army has to do is hold until the Air Force chops up the Iranian strategic command and control centers, their logistics trains and finally the Iranian Army itself. Political generals do not want to be "non-teamplayers".
In those rooms and in those discussions the ground generals are not saying:
"Dammit this is the stupidest thing you idiots have come up with yet! We are losing every place in Iraq that we do not maintain a 24/7 presence and even in some of those places we are having a lot of trouble. The majority of our forces are not configured right now to conduct maneuver operations against a conventional force. Our maneuver element headquarters are all hunkered down in fortified FOB's. To take those brigades and battalions and move them to face a conventional force we will risk several things -
- we will lose control of the cities and towns we currently control
- our forces, while on the move will be slow - to avoid asynchronous attack from insurgent forces - we will have to modify our maneuver doctrine to account for this and in doing so lose our technological advantage in maneuver warfare
- The Iraqi Army is not ready in training or equipment to face the Iranian Army; they would be of no help
- We cannot pull American units from most sectors and leave the Iraqi Army in control of the fight against the insurgents - the Iraqi Army in many cases would either not fight or simply disintegrate. In either event the insurgents would gain ground
The Iranians could and would penetrate into the south cutting off supply routes from Kuwait, we could and would overcome this but it would take time and we would experience losses greater than we have seen at any point thus far. We do not have the option of waiting for the Air Force to dismember the Iranian Army - US forces in Iraq require those supplies from Kuwait - without them we lose combat effectiveness on a daily basis.
More importantly, the introduction of a Shiite army directly opposing our presence in Iraq - following a US attack on another Muslim country - would solidify opposition to us. It would also allow Iranian special forces to take a direct role in insurgent operations in Iraq, no more secret veiled participation.
So gentlemen, this plan will not work, it is potentially disastrous and it will result in the US being forced to leave Iraq with a strategic defeat."
That is what a brave ground general would say to anyone that proposed an attack on Iran.
Of course this assumes a couple of things that one would assume that little countries have learned by now when fighting the US.
First - you have to use your little air force early and often. We are going to kill it anyway so it is better to let it die by your own hand. Aggressively using all of your air power early will force US air assets to counter you. This will buy your ground forces and command and control centers just a little bit more time. Plus, your efforts just might result in some small success. Use it or lose it - we can only assume the Iranians have figured this out.
Second - the same is true of ground forces - in a conventional fight waiting is disaster when you fight the US. A bold move to cut off the southern supply routes would be just the sort of thing we would have a hard time countering initially. When you fight the US you are not fighting to win all the battles, you are fighting to win the strategic war. If you are going to lose your Army anyway you might as well get some success out of it.
If the US does initiate an air/missile attack against Iran then how it all plays out is completely up to the Iranian - sit and wait = death and defeat, attack = death but victory.